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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2 December 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Materials Given to Mr. Duc

1. Attached is a copy of the map set delivered to Mr. Duc, together with a copy of my transmittal note.

2. We will bring the total "blue book" map package up to date and will also do this overlay project properly. (The technical problems involved in color registration make the attached set a jury rig, which was the best we could do in the time available.) With luck, your new set will be finished by Tuesday (5 December). We will dispatch it post haste to Paris (via your office) and to Ambassador Bunker in Saigon.

3. Also attached is the force-breakdown table (our data, quickly sanitized) which we gave to Mr. Duc in the Situation Room session that followed the conversation in your office. The superficially or allegedly great discrepancy between U.S. and GVN holdings -- and the attendant, unfortunate public debate -- derives from the fact that their 300,000 figure (a rounded 299,000) has been mis-described as being comparable to our 158,000 figure (the 145,000 adjusted for the past three weeks' developments). What Thieu and the GVN are doing is quite clear: they are calling everyone on the other side a North Vietnamese.

4. Our "total force" figure comparable to their 299,000 is actually 313,000 -- but this has some very soft guestimate

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components: the VC administrative services (36,000), the VC guerrillas (50,000) and the VC cadre (45,000).

5. Duc may not agree with our methodology but I think he now understands it, and also understands that we are not at major substantive variance with the GVN. In explaining these figures, I stuck to the line taken in your office: We are not claiming that none of the individuals grouped in our various VC categories is a regroupee or ethnic northerner. We simply feel that the data on elements labelled "VC" are not sufficiently detailed or reliable to break them all out by ethnic origin. Furthermore, we are sure that these are the components of the Communists' southern organization in which ethnic southerners are concentrated.

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

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The Honorable Nguyen Phu Duc  
Special Assistant to the President of the Republic of Vietnam

Dear Mr. Duc:

Attached is one set of the maps we discussed at the White House on 1 December: the hamlet plot and the friendly/enemy force disposition, by regiment (Map Number 1 in your blue book). These have been run so one can be superimposed on the other as an overlay. Because of the technical problems involved in reproduction, we were only able to make two copies of this set within the time available: one for you and one for Dr. Kissinger. Would you please be good enough to tell Ambassador Phuong that his copy will be delivered to him in Paris.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

George A. Carver, Jr.

Attachment

Comparative Estimate of VC/NVA Combat  
and Administrative Services in South Vietnam  
(in thousands)

	<u>JGS</u>	<u>U.S. Estimate</u>
Regular Combat Forces	<u>165</u>	<u>147</u>
NVA	140	123
VC	25	24
Administrative Services	<u>54</u>	<u>71</u>
NVA	25	35
VC	29	36
Total	<u>219</u>	<u>218</u>
NVA	165	158
VC	54	60
VC Guerrillas	<u>34</u>	<u>50</u>
VC Cadre	<u>46</u>	<u>45</u>
Total VC/NVA	<u>299</u>	<u>313</u>
NVA	165	158
VC	134	155